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Sectoral policies make explicit and implicit assumptions about
the behaviour and capabilities of the agents (such as dynamic
responses to market signals, demand-led assistance, collabora-
tive efforts, participation in financing) which we consider to be
rather unrealistic. Because of this lack of realism, policies that
aim to be neutral often turn out to be highly exclusive. They
fail to give sufficient importance to the special features of the
sector –with its high climatic, biological and commercial risks
and its slow adaptation– or to the fact that those who
take decisions in agriculture are now mostly in an inferior po-
sition because of their incomes below the poverty line, their in-
adequate training, their traditions based on centuries of living
in precarious conditions, and their geographical location in
marginal areas, far from infrastructure and with only a mini-
mum of services and sources of information. These people
have only scanty and imperfect access to the markets which,
according to the prevailing model, should govern decisions
and the (re)distribution of the factors of production. In our
opinion, this explains the patchy and lower-than-expected
growth registered by the sector after the reforms to pro-
mote the liberalization of markets and external openness in
the region. In view of the results of the application of the new
model, it may be wondered whether Latin America can afford
a form of development which excludes over half of its
agricultural producers; what the alternatives are; and what
costs and benefits each of them offers in terms of production
and monetary, social, spatial and other aspects. The article
outlines the changes in policies and their results at the aggre-
gate level, summarizes the arguments usually put forward
to explain agricultural performance in the region, and proposes
a second set of explanations based on a description of the
agents and the responses that may be expected from them,
contrasting the latter with the supposedly neutral nature of
the policies.
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Various authors, such as Schejtman (1982), have
highlighted the heterogeneity of agricultural produc-
ers and, hence, the need to formulate differential pol-
icies in order to obtain the desired results. This was
done in the past, in the context of a paternalistic
State, with policies that were often dictated from
above and, of course, from the capital.
More recently, taking a similar but considerably
more optimistic view, De Janvry and Sadoulet (1993)
conclude that the present time should be particularly
favourable for rural development, because there is
now a better understanding of the dynamics of rural
poverty, the logic behind agrarian institutions, and
the political economy of the reforms.
In our opinion, however, the present situation points
rather in the opposite direction: there is great emphasis
on sectorally “neutral” macroeconomic policies, with
considerable vagueness about the place of sectoral
policies in the “model” and with only incipient em-
phasis on the definition of regional– and local-level
promotional policies but much greater emphasis on
demand-driven actions and services, so that it is the
agents who take the initiative in such demand, which
in many cases should be of a group nature.
Generally speaking, it was expected that the ag-
ricultural sector, which had been heavily burdened
during the almost thirty years of import substitution
policies,1 would now take advantage of the compara-
tive advantages offered by the natural resources of
the region and show all its potential for development
and export growth. So far, however, its performance
has been rather disappointing.
Microeconomic analyses are now beginning to
be made2 which conclude that while neutral policies
have favoured exportable tradeable goods and
–less predictably– some non-tradeables (ECLAC,
1997a), they have also favoured some groups more
than others.
We feel that (supplementing a recent study on
the influence of agents on policies (Binswanger and
Deininger, 1997)) an analysis based on the real situa-
tion and capacity of the various agents to respond to
different policies could help to explain why the
sector as a whole has performed less well than was
expected under the neoliberal model.
Consequently, after analysing the policy changes
made and the indicators of the sector’s performance,
we wish to outline here some reflections which
–based on the different socioeconomic characteristics
of producers and the different degrees of use made of
factors in the various agricultural and forestry prod-
ucts– try to indicate how they are affected by price
signals, policies and instruments and how they are
most likely to respond to them.
II
Economic policies after 1980
Since the mid-1980s, Latin America has experienced
unprecedented changes, passing from a development
strategy aimed at the domestic market, with strong
public sector intervention, to an outward-looking
strategy with deregulated markets, much fiscal con-
trol, and the private sector as the main agent of de-
velopment. It was expected that this new approach
would lead to rapid and more efficient growth, free
from the distortions of the past.
We cannot really speak of the existence of a
single new development model in the region. There
is currently almost general agreement on the need to
maintain the macroeconomic balances, to further
trade and financial openness, to restrict activities by
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1 See, for example, Krueger, Schiff and Valdés, 1990.
2 With regard to the industrial sector, see for example Peres
(ed.), 1998.
the State in the field of production, and to deregulate
markets. There is less consensus, however, on the
need to regulate and supervise the banking system;
on the sequence in which reforms in the areas of
trade, financial liberalization and exchange-rate
policy should be carried out and on the prior need for
a suitable institutional framework in the financial
area; on the need for export promotion and sectoral
and technological development policies; on privat-
ization, and on the content and scope of labour re-
forms (ECLAC, 1995).
The reduction of inflation has undoubtedly
been one of the main achievements. Other macro-
economic variables of key importance for the com-
petitiveness of a tradeable sector such as
agriculture have been tackled less effectively, how-
ever: consequently, many of the national curren-
cies of the region are overvalued, and interest rates
are very high. Because of this situation and the fact
that the reactions of the various agents were less
vigorous than expected, even before the Asian
crisis the 1990s was showing signs of ending with
an average growth rate lower than that of the im-
port substitution period and an income distribution
pattern similar to or even more concentrated than
that of the early 1980s.
Unfortunately, the division into two opposing
camps of those in favour of the neoliberal model, on
the one hand, and those who have serious misgivings
about it, on the other, has not yet permitted a calm
and dispassionate analysis and a constructive debate




In general terms, it may be said that in the period
from the 1950s to the 1980s there were sectoral poli-
cies in favour of agriculture, designed among other
things to offset other policies with an industrial and
urban slant. According to Krueger, Schiff and Valdés
(1990), all in all the policies applied were not favour-
able to agriculture, since the macroeconomic policies
applied had a serious negative impact which the
sectoral policies in favour of agriculture did not man-
age to offset.3 Furthermore, the subsidies for inputs,
water, credit and the prices of various services
favoured those who used them most, that is to say,
medium-sized and large commercial producers
(Gómez Oliver, 1994).
Neoliberalism basically holds that (in conditions
of perfect competition and information) it is the
market that allocates resources best among various
different uses and causes them to flow to the ar-
eas of activity which offer the greatest comparative
advantages to the country and the economic agents.
The private sector thus becomes the main agent of
change.4
Policies involving greater openness (lowering of
tariffs and elimination of import and export hin-
drances, such as quotas and licences) are therefore a
logical consequence of the neoliberal model, though
the great importance attached to exports is not: it
derives in fact from the need to achieve balance-
of-payments equilibrium. Thus, although in industry
it is essential (in medium-sized or small economies)
to have an export-oriented strategy in order to take
full advantage of the potential profits, this is not so in
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3 In this article, “agriculture” is used for the sake of simplicity,
usually meaning the agricultural and livestock sector but also
sometimes forestry and fisheries too.
4 In its “Declaration of Santiago” the Ibero-American Agricul-
tural Forum (Santiago, August 1996) asserted that private enter-
prise (whether in the shape of individually owned private
concerns, cooperatives, companies, communities, or any other
form) is the main agent of change and that the State must play a
facilitating role aimed at strengthening a solid, broad and cre-
ative entrepreneurial base for the benefit of those who take the
risk of embarking on business ventures and that of countries as a
whole, though it tempered this assertion by also reaffirming the
State’s commitment to give support to agriculture, especially
family peasant agriculture and cooperatives, as the most effec-
tive and realistic response for a broad segment of medium-sized
and small agricultural producers for whom, for economic, so-
cial, environmental and cultural reasons, this option represents
their possibility of development.
agriculture, where economies of scale are often
non-existent, nor generally in agroindustry either. In
such a case, then, development based on a domestic
market which demands quality and is open to exter-
nal competition is a perfectly legitimate option.5
In the 1990s, in addition to the efforts made to
liberalize markets and open up the economies to the
exterior, progress has also been made towards decen-
tralization; new arrangements for consultation and
participation; incentives for concerted action by dif-
ferent agents; new forms of association between the
State and private agents; the transfer of functions
from the State to private agents or non-governmental
organizations, and the promotion of horizontal poli-
cies (the improvement of general education, for ex-
ample) rather than sectoral ones.
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5 For example: after the Corporación Colombiana Internacional
completed its studies on the possibility of selling tropical fruit
on foreign markets it was discovered that the domestic market in
Colombia had an unsatisfied demand for such products which
was three or four times greater than the external potential esti-
mated in those studies (IICA, 1996).
TABLE 1
Latin America and the Caribbean: Main features
of changes in agricultural policies
Policies in the 1950s to 1980s Present policies
Strong State centralism Political, institutional and financial decentralization aimed
at serving local projects
State planning and financing of “public” goods and services Demand-oriented approach, with co-financing of invest-
ments in infrastructure and services
Concern for the food security of the country, with research
therefore focussed on increasing production and yields of
staple foods (rice, wheat, maize, potatoes, beans, lentils,
etc.)
Demand-oriented approach, with co-financing of research
both in public research institutes and in universities a
Free technical assistance, with programmes prepared by
State bodies with little or no user participation
Paid private technical assistance in response to demand
from producers, subject to presentation of a project for
competition when subsidies are involved
Subsidized credit through special lines of credit for the sec-
tor
Elimination of specific lines of credit for the agricultural
sector, of development banks, and of the obligation of
private banks to loan a certain proportion of their portfolio
to the sector
Labour reforms leading to the monetization of the rural
economy and the gradual disappearance of sharecrop-
ping-type systems, with their labour force being replaced by
permanent or above all temporary wage labourers
Deregulation of the labour market, although in the case of
agriculture the rules had always been less strict and more
difficult to enforce
Price controls for staple foodstuffs in order to check infla-
tion and keep minimum wages low so as to encourage in-
dustrialization
Freedom of prices
Exchange rates favourable to imports In principle, equilibrium exchange rates
Tariff rates that were generally high but covered a wide
range of rates
Reduction of tariff rates and application of a uniform rate,
albeit with some exceptions, especially for agricultural
products
Taxes on agricultural exports Elimination of taxes and other hindrances to exports
Agrarian reform programmes aimed at reducing the ineffi-
ciency of highly heterogeneous production systems (with
abundant land and capital for a few agents and abundant la-
bour in the case of the rest) and above all at reducing the
possibility of social disorder in rural areas
Replacement of agrarian reform programmes with purchase
through the land market, aided by loans and/or subsidies for
small producers; promotion of formal proof of ownership
through the issue of official property titles a
Source: Prepared by the author.
a For more details, see Appendix 1 and 2.
As a result, the public machinery for agriculture
and the rural environment is currently in the midst of
a process of change, redefinition and justification of
its areas of action and review of its relations with
civil society, whereby the latter changes from being a
mere beneficiary to an important actor, and like the
other areas of government it is striving to increase its
efficiency. In order for civil society to become a
main actor, however, it must first fulfill a number of
requisites: a matter to which we will return later.
Generally speaking, the State has reduced its ac-
tivities. As a result, in the area of agriculture –which
is marked by high risk and the great geographical
dispersion of its agents– a number of gaps have
arisen which have not yet been filled by the private
sector and will not be filled by it in the future unless
compensation is provided in unprofitable areas.
These gaps have had adverse effects, especially for
small and medium-sized producers, in such areas as
access to credit, technical assistance for agriculture,
markets and collection centres, and also in research
aimed at the genetic improvement of seeds and the
whole range of technologies designed to aid agricul-
ture using limited resources and marginal land.
Non-governmental organizations, within their spe-
cialized fields and in keeping with the guidelines laid
down by the bodies which finance them, have filled
some of the gaps left by the State, but their activities,
which are generally on a small scale and are highly
localized, have given rise to problems of coordina-
tion, feedback and dissemination which are even
greater than when rural development was the respon-
sibility of various departments of the State.
In a highly simplified and summary manner,
table 1 outlines the main features of the changes
which have taken place in agricultural policy.
IV
The expected results, and
those actually obtained
In theory, the policies of adjustment, liberalization of
domestic markets and external openness (which also
meant the elimination of the heavy duties levied on
agriculture) should generate higher growth rates for
the sector as a whole than those registered in the past
(3% per year between 1950 and 1980, and 3.5% be-
tween 1970 and 1980). They should also lead to the
redirection of resources to make better use of the
comparative advantages of the region (weakened
however by the intervention policies of the devel-
oped countries). All this should give a strong boost
to export agriculture at the expense of the basic
grains and relatively non-tradeable goods (products
with excessively local consumption patterns, or too
perishable, or whose prices do not make up for trans-
port costs) which form the bulk of traditional peasant
farming production.
Fifteen years after the initiation of the economic
reform processes (although in the agricultural sector
in many countries these only began in the 1990s), it
may be said that production is indeed being restruc-
tured in the expected direction (figure 1), but this
process had already begun in the 1970s, that is to
say, before the reforms. A number of other effects of
the reform processes are not yet clear. What is clear
is that so far the aggregate economic results of the
sector have been less encouraging than was hoped
for by those who promoted the reforms.
Thus, although the crisis of the 1980s did not hit
agriculture as hard as the rest of the economy, the
average annual growth rates of the sector (like those
of the economy as a whole) have not yet fully recov-
ered: average annual growth between 1991 and 19976
was only 2.5%, with big fluctuations from one year
to another (table 2).
The volume of agricultural exports grew rela-
tively strongly (3.1% per year) between 1980 and
1996, but their value increased only slightly up to
1993 because of the decline in international prices.
Over the whole period, the annual growth rate of the
value of exports was 2.1% (figure 2). The share of
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6 Between 1990 and 1995 there were big improvements in aver-
age yields, which increased by 3.3% per year compared with
only 1.3% per year in the 1980s, but the area cultivated, which
had expanded in the 1980s, went down by 2.2% per year (FAO,
1996, p. 170).
non-traditional products (such as tropical or temper-
ate fresh fruit and vegetables) in agricultural exports
has increased, and they now account for nearly 25%
of such exports. In terms of the area planted and the
number of jobs generated, however, non-traditional
exports are much less important.
Agricultural imports, in contrast, which had gone
down sharply between 1981 and 1987 (-5.8% per year in
terms of value), thereafter resumed the rapid growth be-
gun in the mid-1970s (12.1% per year in value between
1987 and 1996). They consist mainly of staple foodstuffs
such as cereals and dairy products. Over the period from
1980 to 1996, agricultural imports grew at an overall
annual rate of 3.0% in volume and 3.9% in value.
In the economy as a whole, growth since the be-
ginning of the 1990s has been based on relatively in-
tensive use of capital and has created little
employment; the difference between the wages of the
most highly skilled workers and the unskilled has in-
creased, as also has the gap between rich and poor.
Generally speaking, the model seems exclusive for a
substantial segment of the population and also for the
agricultural sector (table 3). Contrary to what has oc-
curred in urban areas, in rural areas the levels of pov-
erty and indigence after the crisis seem to have stuck
at high levels: 54% and 31% of rural households or
78.2 and 47.0 million persons, respectively, in 1997
(ECLAC, 1999).
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TABLE 2
Latin America and the Caribbean (23 countries): Gross domestic product
of agriculture, forestry, hunting and fishing, and total GDP less GDP of
agriculture, forestry, hunting and fishing a
(Annual growth rates on the basis of figures in dollars at current prices)

























Ecuador 3.2 4.2 3.0 Dom. 4.0 0.4 3.4 Chile 5.0 5.6 2.2 Guyana 9.5 -2.5 0.9
(3.6) (1.4) Repub. (4.8) (2.9) (8.2) (2.8) (6.6) (-3.1)
Brazil 3.0 2.5 4.7 Bolivia 3.7 1.7 4.1 Peru 4.8 2.2 -0.6 Uruguay 4.2 0.2 0.6
(3.0) (1.5) (4.2) (-0.1) (5.6) (-1.4) (4.1) (-)
Paraguay 2.5 4.0 6.7 Guate- 2.8 1.3 4.7 Nicaragua 4.5 2.9 -0.1 Jamaica 2.6 0.9 0.9
(2.8) (2.7) mala (4.5) (0.8) (1.8) (-1.8) (0.1) (2.3)
Honduras 3.4 2.7 2.7 Argentina 2.4 1.3 2.1
(3.8) (2.3) (5.7) (-0.9)
Costa 2.6 3.1 2.6
Rica (3.6) (2.1)
Venezuela 1.5 2.0 2.9 Mexico 1.6 1.2 3.4 Panama 1.6 2.9 1.3 Trin.and 1.5 0.1 -3.0
(3.4) (-0.9) (2.9) (1.9) (5.1) (1.2) Tobago (2.5) (-2.7)
Colombia 1.4 3.0 4.4 El Sal- 1.2 -1.4 2.4
(4.6) (3.9) vador (6.0) (-0.2)
Barbados -1.2 -0.2 -1.1
(0.9) (1.3)
Haiti -6.4 -0.2 1.5
(-1.4) (-0.7)
Source: Prepared on the basis of figures provided by the ECLAC Statistical Division.
a The shaded figures correspond to agricultural GDP growth higher than the average for the region as a whole (excluding Brazil) and the
figures in parentheses correspond to the annual growth rate of GDP in constant dollars, less the agricultural GDP.
Average annual growth rates of agricultural GDP of the region:




Average annual growth rates of total GDP less agricultural GDP
Without Brazil With Brazil
1991-1997 4.1 3.7
1981-1990 0.9 1.1
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FIGURE 1
Latin America and the Caribbean:
Changes in the structure of production
Source: ECLAC/IICA (1997), with data from the United Nations
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).
FIGURE 2
Latin America and the Caribbean:
Agricultural trade
(Base 1989-1991 = 100)
Source: FAO-Internet, December 1998.
TABLE 3
Latin America: Changes in the structure of
agricultural production, 1970-1995
Product Sector A Sector B Area Productivity Labour intensity
Oilseeds X Greatly increased Greatly increased Low intensity
Cereals X Increased Greatly increased Low intensity
Cereals X Went down Remained unchanged Medium intensity
Fruit and vegetables X X Increased Increased Intensive
Stock-raising (for meat) X X Increased Increased somewhat Low intensity
Stock-raising (for milk) X X Increased Increased Intensive
Small livestock (poultry, pigs) X Very small Increased Intensive
Tubers and pulses X Remained unchanged Remained unchanged Medium intensity
Artificial forests X Increased somewhat Increased Low intensity
Natural forests X Went down Remained unchanged —
Source: Prepared by the author.
a Sector A: mainly modern
Sector B: mainly traditional.
V
Interpretation of the somewhat
disappointing performance of agriculture
It is important to note that the promoters of the re-
forms had identified serious hindrances to develop-
ment –especially for the agricultural sector– in the
previous model and were expecting that the reforms
would bring more dynamic growth than in the past.
In order to understand why the performance was
lower than expected,7 it should be borne in mind
that the countries applied adjustment, free-market
and economic openness measures of different inten-
sities, spread over time in different manners,8 with a
number of exceptions for the agricultural sector. In
a number of countries the markets only began to be
liberalized at the end of the 1980s or even later
(figure 3), while others, after a short spell of liberal-
ization, reintroduced tariffs and support measures for
prices and domestic sales.9 Indeed, many of the
changes in agricultural policy, rather than forming
part of a well-defined development strategy, were in
the nature of special measures taken in response to
short-term macroeconomic or sectoral problems and
demands by pressure groups.
The trade negotiations did not fit in with clear
strategies either, and the consolidated levels agreed
upon in the Uruguay Round (the theoretical tariff) re-
sulted in great dispersion, even between countries
with bilateral or multilateral agreements, and did not
form a complete structure of corrective duties to
make up for the unequal conditions of competition.10
Furthermore, during much of the last 15 years
the efforts to secure greater openness have coincided
with a depressed world market, with (in most of the
countries of the region) exchange rates that were first
over-devalued and then over-revalued,11 more expen-
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7 ECLAC is carrying out two interdisciplinary projects of broad
scope in order to analyse whether it was the theory or its manner
of application which went wrong, or if it is too early as yet to
see all the benefits of the reforms. Here we will merely outline
the explanations that would appear to be applicable with regard
to the agricultural sector.
8 See, for example, Ramos (1997).
9 This occurred, for example, in Chile (with the reintroduction
of government purchasing programmes after the 1982 crisis and
the introduction of official price ranges), while Colombia intro-
duced or reintroduced measures such as minimum import prices,
compulsory prior licences, a stabilization fund for cotton, a
more active role for the reception stations of the Agricultural
Marketing Institute (IDEMA), the restoration of lines of credit,
a rescue operation for the Caja Agraria bank, a technological
shock plan and agricultural insurance. José Antonio Ocampo,
who was Minister of Agriculture of Colombia in 1993, justified
these measures because of the great economic and above all so-
cial importance of the sector and also because, as he said, “the
idea that the mere lowering of levels of protection for agricul-
ture as a whole was all that was necessary in order to make the
sector flourish has been a failure” (Colombia, Ministry of Agri-
culture, 1993, pp. 3-7.
FIGURE 3
Latin America (9 countries):
Changes in average tariffs for foodstuffs
Source: ECLAC/IICA (1997), on the basis of data from the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).
10 An example of this is the Andean countries, which have a
common external tariff (between 15% and 20%), supplemented
with price ranges or flexible tariffs for a number of agricultural
products. However, Colombia negotiated consolidated tariffs
ranging from 15% to 332%, with an average of 118%; Ecuador
negotiated an average tariff of 26%; Venezuela consolidated its
tariffs for most agricultural products at 40%, but with some spe-
cial tariff ranges which brought the average up to 59%; and
Bolivia consolidated its tariffs at a uniform 40%: i.e., three
times the normal tariff (IICA, 1996).
11 If we compare the real exchange rate prevailing in 1996 with
that of 1990, we see that it rose and hence favoured exports in
only six countries: Bolivia, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay,
Costa Rica (up to 1995) and Mexico (in 1994 and 1995). In all
the other countries it went down (ECLAC/IICA, 1997, on the
basis of ECLAC data).
sive and restricted credit,12 and a decline in per capita
income which led to lower domestic consumption of
agricultural products and a shift towards cheaper
products, often provided by traditional agriculture
(such as cereals, dried pulses and roots and tubers).
Together, all these factors probably held back the ex-
pected restructuring of the more modern sector. The
lower use of various State services and their only
partial replacement by equivalent or better private
services, together with the limited adaptation capac-
ity of the traditional peasant sector (because of lack
of resources, lack of information and excessive
risks), also probably held back possible changes in
the sector, except for some successful examples of
vertical coordination with agribusiness, especially
for export. In this context, the reforms have tended to
cause tensions between farmers and the authorities
which –as in the developed countries– have often
been settled through the reintroduction of protection-
ist measures.
Thanks to policies aimed at greater trade open-
ness and the development registered in infrastructure,
agricultural production has become more internation-
ally tradeable and the price of the products depends
less and less on micro-regional and national supply
and demand (or tariff and price policies) and more
and more on variations in external supply and de-
mand. The regulatory effect on producers’ income
exerted in the past by rises (or falls) in prices due to
bad (or plentiful) local harvests is less and less no-
ticeable. In the face of this growing exposure to in-
ternational prices, the agricultural sector will be able
to sustain itself if: i) it manages to produce at inter-
nationally competitive prices and to create mecha-
nisms for reducing risks (or offering sufficiently high
income to offset them) and for keeping own-account
producers, employers and wage-earners in business,
and ii) it can attract the investments needed to con-




So far, the interpretation made of the reasons for the
performance registered by agriculture has been of a
rather traditional nature. We will now explain why
we feel that a number of the innovations made in
policies for the sector will tend to be exclusive un-
less they are accompanied by measures to boost the
sector’s functioning.
1. The agents and the actual agricultural and
rural situation in the region
A very rough calculation of the economically active
population (EAP) of the region indicates that there
are some 17 million agricultural producers –employ-
ers and own-account workers– out of a total agricul-
tural EAP of some 41 million persons. These
producers are the economic agents who are expected
to respond to policy stimuli. We will leave aside the
3 million employers (who should have a greater re-
sponse capacity one way or another because they
have more capital and probably more training) and
concentrate on the 14 million own-account agricul-
tural workers (figure 4 and table 4). According to
poverty statistics (ECLAC, 1999), the percentage of
poor among these own-account workers is similar to
that of the rural population as a whole, so that
roughly 55% of these 14 million are below the pov-
erty line (and a third of them may also be below the
indigence line), with everything that that implies in
terms of capacity to accumulate investment re-
sources, to think past the short term, to take risks and
innovate and to see agricultural activities as a valid
long-term option.
If we also add the lack of schooling (which is
even more marked among the decision-makers, that
is to say, those over 40-50 years of age), the flaws
and asymmetrical aspects of the information market,
and the ever-increasing requirements of a flexible,
open and globalized market, it is easy to understand
why such an important group of agents is at a serious
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12 If we compare the real interest rate prevailing in 1996 with
that of 1992, we see that it went down in Chile, Honduras,
Panama, Peru, Venezuela, Brazil (as from 1994) and Costa Rica
(as from 1993), but in all the other countries it went up
(ECLAC/IICA, on the basis of ECLAC data).
disadvantage in terms of responding to supposed pol-
icy stimuli or is indifferent to them. We use the term
“indifferent” because as they do not have access to
credit it is all the same to them whether interest rates
rise or fall, and if they primarily consume their own
production or use mainly domestic inputs and goods
they have little direct interest in whether the ex-
change rate is higher or lower.
Fixed transaction costs and the existence of im-
perfect markets (especially for land, credit and la-
bour) also explain the apparent lack of reaction to
price changes of large groups of agricultural produc-
ers constrained by their shortage of resources. The
fixed transaction costs (for information, organization
and hiring) that must be incurred in order to progress
from production for one’s own consumption to pro-
duction for the market can be very high, thus making
it necessary to produce a certain minimum quantity
even though production itself may be neutral in terms
of scale. Furthermore, these fixed transaction costs
may not be recoverable through other activities, and
if they are very high they would make it necessary to
participate in a given market for a number of years in
a row. For this reason, producers may decide not to
incur such costs unless they are sure of being able to
participate in the market for the necessary length of
time. Thus, in proportion as participation in the mar-
kets is more risky and there are no insurance mecha-
nisms external to the farm, producers will opt to
continue with an approach based on food
self-sufficiency longer than would appear to be war-
ranted by the size of transaction costs. This is why
even small producers who participate actively in the
markets tend to continue producing crops for their
own consumption (De Janvry and Sadoulet, 1998).
2. The explicit and implicit assumptions behind
the new sectoral policy approaches
We will now deal with several of the policies out-
lined in table 1, formulating our reservations in re-
spect of each of them.
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Latin America in the 1990s: The real agricultural and rural situation in figures
Latin Argen- Bolivia Brazil Chile Colom- Costa Jamaica Mexico Peru Vene-
America tina bia Rica zuela
% agricultural EAP/total EAP (1994) 23.9 9.4 39.4 21.9 11.2 24.7 21.4 25.4 27.5 32.6 9.4
% agricultural GDP/total GDP (1997) 7.6 6.6 14.9 6.9 6.8 13.5 14.9 7.6 6.6 7.0 4.8
% agricultural exports (including forestry,
fisheries and processed products)/total exports a 26 55 28 35 39 38 69 9 32 4
Agricultural GDP in 1997 (millions of
1990 dollars) 103 656.3 13 513.4 1 033.8 36 471.7 3 519.0 7 196.3 1 080.4 298.3 21 070.2 3 654.8 2 903.4
Agricultural EAP (thousands, 1994) 41 000 1 148 931 13 110 571 2 885 251 319 9 016 2 554 719
Productivity of agricultural EAP in 1994
(in constant 1990 dollars) 2 528 11 033 1 009 3 504 5 320 2 415 4 186 1 043 2 189 1 253 3 878
Annual growth rate of agricultural EAP
(1980-1993) 0.4 -1 1.2 -0.3 -0.3 0.4 0.4 0.6 1 1.2 -0.7
Agricultural employers (thousands) 3 000 643.5 39.9 13.5 1 205.5 105.2
Own-account agricultural producers
(thousands) 14 000 4 263.3 192.7 54.2 2 737.4 217.7
% of poor among own-account
agricultural producers b 89 56 20 67 24 68 44
6 or more years of formal schooling
(% of total 15-24 group) 29 88 47 82 80
6 or more years of formal schooling
(% of total 25-59 group) 15 60 25 70 48
Average size of farms (hectares) c 60.9 469.0 64.7 94.1 26.3 40.6 24.6 18 82.6
Number of farms of less than
5 hectares (thousands) c 57.0 2 977.5 134.3 700.2 35.2 2 620.4 1 026.2 169.7
% of farms of less than 5 hectares c 47.5 15.1 39.7 42.5 59.5 45.8 59.4 78.0 44.8
Arable land/agricultural EAP (hectares
per person, 1993) 3.0 21.6 2.3 3.2 7.0 1.4 1.1 0.5 2.6 1.3 4.5
Arable land/tractors in use
(hectares per tractor, 1993) 80.8 89.3 396.3 57.1 95.5 107.4 40.7 50.3 134.6 206.1 65.6
Agricultural GDP in 1996/hectares of
arable land (in 1990 dollars) 948 527 464 1 184 819 1 874 3 819 2 266 901 1 042 872
Source: Dirven (1997), ECLAC/IICA (1997), ECLAC (1999), and ECLAC, Statistics and Projections Division, computerized tables (March 1998).
a Approximate values for 1995.
b Including agriculture, stock-raising, fisheries, hunting and forestry; data for 1996 or 1997, except in the case of Venezuela, where the data are for 1994.
c Data taken from agricultural censuses (various years).
i) Political and financial decentralization de-
signed to further local projects. In order to imple-
ment this approach, the agents must have: sufficient
organizational capacity and political weight for their
demands to be heard; capacity to formulate their de-
mands in the required formats, types of content and
time limits; and capacity to supervise and control re-
gional action. Experience shows that many agricul-
tural producers lack these capabilities and have no
access to the training needed in order to acquire
them.13
ii) Investments in infrastructure and services
based on the demand of the beneficiary population
and co-financing. Because of low geographical den-
sity, rural infrastructure and services are generally
more expensive per unit of benefit and beneficiary,
and many of the latter have little or no payment ca-
pacity.
iii) Demand-oriented and co-financed research
in both research institutes and universities. The situ-
ation observed here is one of relative neglect of basic
research, with greater emphasis on shorter-term and
directly applicable research projects, a shift from sta-
ple products to non-traditional products with greater
added value, and some divergence between the inter-
national research centres, which continue to be ori-
ented towards research on staple foods, and the
national research centres, which seek to meet the
needs of the more dynamic producers.
iv) Elimination of free State technical assistance
and its replacement by paid private technical assis-
tance. The latter is provided in response to demand
from producers and, when accompanied by a sub-
sidy, after presentation of a project in a competition.
The problems arise because of the lack of payment
capacity of some producers; unsatisfactory capacity
to formulate projects for competition in the required
formats; inadequate dissemination and socialization
of the experience gained; failure to comply with
deadlines and lack of continuity of efforts; lack of in-
terest of consultants in travelling to more distant
places or carrying out more complex and higher-risk
projects; and insufficient capacity for the evaluation
of proposals and control of projects by the authorities
which co-finance or subsidize the projects.
v) Elimination of specific lines of credit for the
agricultural sector. The agricultural sector is less at-
tractive to credit institutions than other sectors of the
economy both because of the inherently high risks in
its activities (risks due to the weather, phyto-sanitary
factors and sharp fluctuations in prices) and the in-
sufficient means for reducing these risks (insurance,
stabilization funds, futures), and because of the
heavy indebtedness of many farmers and their geo-
graphical dispersion. According to partial informa-
tion from a number of countries of the region,14 credit
for the agricultural sector has gone down substan-
tially since the reforms, especially for small and me-
dium-sized producers.
vi) Replacement of agrarian reform programmes
by purchases made through the land market, with the
aid of credit and/or subsidies for small producers.
Efforts to determine whether the desired objectives
are being achieved by this means have only begun re-
cently. According to some studies15 made in Mexico
and Peru (both of which made a thorough-going re-
view of the laws governing the land market in the
early 1990s), the market for both the rental and the
sale or purchase of land is generally sluggish but
tends towards the concentration of ownership in the
categories of medium and large landowners.
It would therefore appear that while the policies
applied are outwardly neutral, in reality they are of-
ten highly exclusive because they do not take ac-
count of the special features of the agricultural
sector, the serious shortcomings in a number of its
markets, the high transaction costs which prevail, or
the lack of physical, financial, human and social cap-
ital among many of its agents. The results of these
policies are nevertheless considered politically and
morally justified because they are “responses to de-
mand”.
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13 See Durston (1999) on ways of promoting the acquisition of
these capabilities.
14 Including Brazil, Costa Rica, Mexico and Peru (the informa-
tion is based on presentations and as yet unpublished documents
presented at the seminar on the impact of structural reforms on
agriculture in Latin America, organized by ECLAC at Santiago,
Chile, from 25 to 27 November 1998).
15 Carried out in 1997 and 1998 under an ECLAC/FAO project
in the first case and an ECLAC/GTZ project in the second.
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VIII
Conclusions
The available information indicates that in the 1990s
the growth rate of agricultural production has been
below its historical level and agricultural exports
have grown a good deal more slowly than agricul-
tural imports. Furthermore, there are more and more
indications that modernization and increases in
yields have been concentrated among a limited num-
ber of farmers, while the others have not shared in
this progress or have even suffered setbacks.
In our opinion, the fact that large groups of pro-
ducers are not forming part of the growth processes
that –according to the advocates of the reforms–
should have begun with the policy reorientation mea-
sures is due to a lack of realism: insufficient account
was taken of the special features of the agricultural
sector and the disadvantages of its agents. This lack
of response by a major group of agents would appear
to be the reason why, in aggregate terms, the sector
has turned in a rather mediocre performance.
Can there be dynamic rural development without
the incorporation of this group into new forms of
production? Can there be dynamic, balanced and eq-
uitable national development with the exclusion that
stems from the policies studied here? What are the
alternatives, and the costs and benefits of the differ-
ent options?
The answers to these questions are not easy, es-
pecially as there seems to be little room for sectoral
and regional actions in a model governed by the mar-
ket.
The persistence of rural poverty has given rise to
policies of investment in infrastructure and services
(especially health and education) which are undoubt-
edly very necessary and –along the lines suggested
by De Janvry and Sadoulet (1998)– should help to
reduce transaction costs to some extent and hence al-
low a larger group of agents to participate profitably
in the market.
Another response has been to divide up the poor
sector of the rural population between those whose
assets are considered sufficient to give them a chance
of overcoming poverty through improvements in
their production, trade or organization and those who
are deemed to require help through social policies.
As long as the persons in this latter category only
form a relatively small proportion of the total popu-
lation or of the population of a particular region, this
position can be justified from the economic point of
view, although not necessarily from the point of view
of development in general and still less from that of
human and social capital formation. But what should
we do if these persons represent a high proportion of
the total population? How can we foster a virtuous
circle of agricultural or non-agricultural productive
activities, in a reasonable length of time and at rea-
sonable cost, in areas with relatively scanty natural
resources and underdeveloped physical and human
capital?16
The truth is that even if there were a political and
conceptual framework that permitted more decided ac-
tion in this respect it would still not be clear whether it
is possible to induce such a virtuous circle, or how. It is
very necessary that future efforts to develop new
technical approaches and concrete practical propos-
als should seek the answers to these questions.
(Original: Spanish)
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16 This latter concern arose, among other reasons, as a result of
repeated conversations on the subject with Maximiliano Cox,
Regional Adviser of ECLAC, and also with Julio Berdegué, Di-
rector of the International Network on the Methodology of Pro-
duction Systems Research (RIMISP).
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APPENDIX 1
Latin America: Evolution of national
agricultural innovation institutes (INIA)
1960: The “Green Revolution” technological package is
distributed as a public good.
The establishment of INIAs is begun in most of the coun-
tries of the region, and existing INIAs are further strength-
ened.
1970: The budgetary allocations for INIAs are increased
and their staffs grow.
The INIAs obtain excellent results in fulfilling their mis-
sion, as shown by all the impact evaluation studies made.
1980: The crisis of the 1980s severely affects the financing
of INIAs. By the end of the decade, all of them are affected
by the effects of the crisis and of the adjustment
programmes.
In addition to these budget cuts, financial resources for
agricultural research provided by international agencies
and donor countries are also reduced.
The INIAs enter into a crisis: in a first stage, their manning
tables continue to grow by inertia, while their financing is
reduced, so that there are fewer resources for research and
fewer resources per researcher.
Towards the end of the decade, a number of institutes dras-
tically cut their staff, including even the most highly quali-
fied staff members, while others reduce their manning
tables and payrolls.
1990: Reforms are begun in almost all the INIAs of the re-
gion, in an environment marked by relative shortage of
funds for research, growing appropriability of technology,
and the emergence of new demands posed to the INIAs.
The latter are mainly the result of the intensive processes of
urbanization (demand for post-harvesting technologies) and
the processes of greater openness and deregulation (tech-
nologies and processes for increasing value added, improv-
ing competitiveness and developing the production of
non-traditional agricultural exports).
On another level, the demands for a more prominent role
for the private sector are reflected in reforms in the organi-
zation and statutes of the INIAs.
New forms of financing appear, such as foundations for
technological research and transfer and funds available
through competitions.
The main INIAs of the region recover from the point of
view of fiscal budget allocations and also markedly increase
the generation of resources of their own.
The reforms are basically as follows:
a) Research programmes in line with the clients’ demands
are established and agricultural producers and represen-
tatives of the private sector are brought into their govern-
ing councils.
b) Programmes connected with poverty and extreme pov-
erty and preservation of natural resources and the envi-
ronment begin to be given priority, largely at the request
of international agencies.
c) In many INIAs priority is given to the development of
processes and technologies for improving competitive-
ness, post-harvesting technologies and biotechnology.
Programmes are established for agroindustry and the de-
velopment of non-traditional export crops.
d) In order to secure greater efficiency in the management
of budgetary resources, outlays considered to be less im-
portant are reduced and various services are outsourced.
e) The INIAs increase the generation of resources of their
own, through the sale of goods and services and even by
selling off assets.
Research and the transfer of technology are regionalized as
a way of making them more efficient and bringing the insti-
tutions closer to their clients.
Source: César Morales, ECLAC, on the basis of information from the various INIAs.
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APPENDIX 2
Recent changes in land tenure legislation
Country, law and objective Main features of the law Strengthening of institutions
Bolivia, 1996. Law on the National
Agrarian Reform Service.
Objective: to increase the equity and
security of land tenure.
Members of the indigenous popula-
tion have preferential access to public
lands.
Process of clearing land ownership ti-
tles over a period of ten years.
Land tax.
Land inventory and register, adminis-
tered at the municipal level.
System for the settlement of prob-
lems.
Colombia, 1994. Law No. 160, set-
ting up the National Agrarian Reform
and Rural Development System.
Objective: to facilitate access of poor
peasants to land.
The beneficiaries of the programme
are responsible for negotiating the
purchase of land directly with its owner.
The State gives a direct subsidy of up
to 70% of the purchase price.
The remaining 30% can be financed
with long-term State credit.
Restructuring of the National Agrar-
ian Reform Institute to adapt it to its
new role of facilitating and supervis-
ing land transactions.
Mexico: 1992. Amendment to article
27 of the 1917 Constitution.
Objective: eliminating hindrances to
development.
The government is no longer obliged
to provide land to all who ask for it.
Communal landowners (“ejidatarios”)
can become private owners and sell,
rent, sharecrop or mortgage their
property.
Ejidatarios are no longer obliged to
work their land themselves.
Size limits are maintained (100 hect-
ares of irrigated land).
Commercial companies can acquire
land.
Establishment of local Agrarian Tri-
bunals to settle disputes over property
rights.
Establishment of the “Procaduría
Agraria” to watch over the proper ap-
plication of the law.
Establishment of the National Land
Register.
Programme for the certification of
ejido rights and issue of ownership
titles for urban plots (PROCEDE).
Peru, 1991, 1992 and 1995. Agrarian
Law.
Objective: to expand and strengthen
private property rights.
Authorization to sell or mortgage land
obtained under the agrarian reform
process.
Authorization for issue of individual
titles to communal land, subject to the
agreement of over 50% of the com-
munal owners.
Size limits are maintained (1000 hect-
ares).
Commercial companies can acquire
land.
Special project for the issue of official
titles to land.
Source: Information provided by Frank Vogelgesang, based on the ECLAC/GTZ project on policies to promote rural land markets.
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